Abstract. We axiomatize Leitgeb's (2005) theory of truth and show that this theory proves all arithmetical sentences of the system of ramified analysis up to 0 . We also give alternative axiomatizations of Kripke's (1975) theory of truth (Strong Kleene and supervaluational version) and show that they are at least as strong as the Kripke-Feferman system KF and Cantini's VF, respectively.
fixed point based on supervaluations (in Cantini's version), which is usually axiomatized by VF. 8 (3) Leitgeb's minimal fixed point based on his notion of semantic dependence 9 , which has not been axiomatized so far. By axiomatizing these semantic theories in our modular system we hope to advance understanding of differences and similarities between them.
This paper is organized as follows. In order to motivate our axioms we briefly review the semantic theories mentioned above (section 2). In section 3 we lay down our list of axioms. In section 4 we prove the consistency of our axiom systems. Their proof-theoretic strength is assessed in section 5. The first main result is that our axiom system for Leitgeb's theory is at least as strong as RA < 0 ; our second main result is that nothing is lost in proof-theoretic strength if we pass from KF or VF to their alternatives presented here. We conclude with some final observations and say a few words as to how our systems differ from Feferman's axioms for determinateness and truth. 10 Some remarks on terminology. Our object language will be the language L T of Peano arithmetic enlarged by the unary predicate T . L P A denotes the language without the Tpredicate. By PA we understand the usual axioms of Peano arithmetic, while PAT consists of the axioms of Peano arithmetic with induction for all sentences in the language L T . The models considered have the form (N, S), where N is the standard model of PA and S ⊆ ω interprets the truth predicate T . We will identify the sentences of L T with their numerical codes g (φ) relative to some (unspecified) Gödel numbering g. If φ is a sentence, then φ stands for the Gödel numeral of φ, that is, φ N = g (φ). As is well known, most syntactic operations on the expressions of the language L T are primitive recursive (p. r.) and hence can be represented in L T . We assume that our language contains function symbols for all p. r. functions. We will use the dot notation to denote these functions; for example,¬ represents that function that maps the code of a sentence to the code of its negation;∧ represents that function that sends the codes of two formulae to the code of their conjunction, etc. For details see Halbach (2011) . In section 3 we will expand the language L T by the unary predicate G. Models will then have the form (N, X, Y ), where X ⊆ ω interprets G and Y ⊆ ω interprets T . §2. Semantic theories of grounded truth. In theories of grounded truth, a determinate truth-value is assigned only to those sentences 'whose truth value is grounded in atomic facts from the base language L, that is can be determined from such facts by evaluation according to the rules of truth for the connectives and quantifiers, and where statements of the form T A are evaluated to be true (false) only when A itself has already been verified (falsified).' 11 Technically, the extension of the truth predicate is obtained by a fixed point construction. We briefly review the constructions.
2.1. Kripke. This is a general recipe for constructing interesting extensions for the truth predicate by recursion along the ordinals. Fix some monotone evaluation schema V . (Often, this requires that we do not only have an extension but also an anti-extension for the truth predicate at hand. We assume throughout that the anti-extension of T relative to some model (N, S) consists of the negations of sentences in S.) An evaluation schema is monotone if for all X, Y with X ⊆ Y and all sentences φ we have:
Then the construction is as follows. Let S 0 = ∅. Given S α , let S α+1 consist of all the sentences that come out true relative to (N, S α ) under the given evaluation schema. At limit points we just take unions. For cardinality reasons, there must be some fixed point S β = S β+1 . We say that a sentence is grounded (relative to the evaluation schema) if and only if the sentence or its negation is in the fixed point.
In the present paper we will focus on two monotone evaluation schemes: the Strong Kleene schema and the supervaluational schema (in Cantini's version). We assume that the reader is familiar with the Strong Kleene schema. 12 The successor rule for the supervaluational schema can be written as follows:
Here, X is consistent if there is no sentence φ such that both φ, ¬φ ∈ X , and | refers to the classical evaluation schema. Now let K be the fixed point obtained by using the Strong Kleene schema and let C be the fixed point obtained by the supervaluational schema. 13 For the rest of the paper, we will consider (N, K ) and (N, C) as classical models, that is in what follows | will always refer to the classical evaluation schema.
One significant difference between (N, K ) and (N, C) is that the latter satisfies the global reflection principle for Peano arithmetic with full induction for the language L T while the former does not, that is
where Prov P AT (x) defines the set of sentences that are provable from Peano arithmetic with full induction for the language L T . For example we have (N, C) | T λ ∨ ¬λ but (N, K ) | T λ ∨ ¬λ (where λ is the Liar sentence).
Leitgeb.
Leitgeb's approach is novel insofar as it clearly seperates the concept of grounding from that of truth. Accordingly, we are confronted not with a single recursion that gives us the set of grounded truths, but rather the set of grounded sentences is given by a first recursion and the set of grounded truths is extracted by a second recursion. The central notion for the construction of the set of grounded sentences is the notion of dependence or determination:
φ depends on iff for all 1 , 2 :
Here, φ i denotes the truth value of φ in the model (N, i ). Thus, a sentence φ is determined by a collection of sentences iff for all 1 , 2 : if
Both sequences are monotone and reach a fixed-point. We denote these by G and L, respectively. G is the set of grounded sentences, while L contains those that are true. If we let L − be the set of sentences whose negation is in L, then we get the equation G = L ∪L − . G has some nice closure properties: PROPOSITION 2.1.
1. All arithmetical sentences are grounded.
All theorems of PAT (and their negations
In fact, the sentences mentioned under (1) and (2) come in at the first stage of the hierarchy; (3)- (7) provide closure conditions.
It is easy to show that L ⊆ C. In fact, the inclusion is proper. 15 For example, the sentence T 1 = 1 ∨ λ, where λ is the Liar, enters Cantini's construction at stage 2, but it is not in G, since it depends on λ. However, since we know that 1 = 1 is true, we can also determine the truth value of T 1 = 1 ∨ λ. As another example, we may take the sentence T 1 = 1 ∧ λ, which is easily seen to be false (since 1 = 1 is false). This sentence is not in G, but it is again a part of C. It follows from the first example that L (in contrast to C) invalidates the claim that Modus Ponens preserves truth:
However, by a little modification we can make L equal to C. 16 This can be done by introducing the notion of conditional dependence, and by further restricting the quantifiers in the definition to consistent supersets. 17 We say that φ c-depends on iff for all consistent 1 , 2 ⊇ : if 1 ∩ = 2 ∩ , then φ 1 = φ 2 . Now by transfinite recursion define G α , L α for α ∈ O N by:
It can then be shown that L α = C α for all α ∈ O N . Indeed, we have G α = C α ∪C − α , and the above construction shows how we can extract the grounding hierarchy corresponding to C in a recursive way.
The following picture emerges: a grounding hierarchy starts with some initial set of grounded sentences-for example, the arithmetical sentences, or, if you work within a classical framework, the arithmetical sentences plus all arithmetical truths and falsehoods in the language L T . Their truth-value is determined by the world (the base model) and the chosen evaluation schema. At the next stage of the hierarchy, all sentences are added that depend on the initial set, and so on. Of course, the extension of 'depends on' varies with the evaluation schema. The Strong Kleene evaluation schema yields a different extension than the supervaluational schema. In the next section we will see that all members of such a grounding hierarchy satisfy the compositional truth axioms plus the T-schema. The systems will only differ with respect to the extension of the grounding predicate G. §3. The axioms. The novelty of Leitgeb's approach is the clear seperation of the concepts of grounding and truth. Accordingly, in axiomatizing his theory we introduce two unary predicates T (x) and G (x), meaning 'x is true' and 'x is grounded', respectively, and give seperate axioms for both predicates. Leitgeb begins his paper by raising the following question: 'What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on nonsemantic state of affairs (only).' It seems, then, that what Leitgeb wants to get is a restricted version of the T-schema, viz.
In addition, we also add the compositional axioms for T (relative to G). The idea here is to take all the naïve principles of truth and restrict them in a uniform way. This leaves us with the task of specifying the axioms of grounding. We start with an axiom that occupies a peculiar status:
This axiom says that the grounded sentences are exactly those that are true or have a true negation. This is exactly the definition of grounding that Kripke gave: truth comes first, and grounding is derived. Thus the predicate G is eliminable. However, on Leitgeb's approach the order is reversed: grounding is conceptually prior to truth. First the grounding hierarchy is defined, then the truth hierarchy is defined based on the grounding hierarchy. In fact, as far as Leitgeb's theory is concerned, G0 (though sound) might even be dropped − and there might be a good reason for doing so: as we will see below, G0 together with the T -schema (T7 below) implies (T-Out). Now (T-Out) proves the Liar sentence. Thus theories which contain G0 and T7 prove untrue sentences. This has led to criticism by Field. 18 And we will see below that our axioms for Leitgeb's theory-even if we drop G0-are still sufficient to prove all arithmetical statements of ramified analysis. 19, 20 3.1. Axioms of Grounding. We start with the base and closure axioms, Axioms G1-G7. These mirror (1)- (7) of Proposition 2.1 stated above for Leitgeb's theory.
Closure Axioms.
Here and below, v ranges over the set of (codes of) variables, t ranges over the set of (codes of) closed terms, and x, y range over the (codes of the) formulae of L T .
Jump Axiom.
where Rel (x, φ ) says that x is a sentence in which every occurence of a subformula T t is relativized to φ, that is every occurrence of a subformula T t of x occurs in the context φ (t) ∧ T t. 21 Axioms for Conditional Dependence.
Axioms of Truth.
We take the compositional truth axioms (relativized to G) for the full language (including the truth-predicate) plus the uniform Tarskian biconditionals (again, relativized to G). In the first and second axiom, the variables s, t range over the set of closed terms, while s • denotes the value of s. In the last axiom, t . indicates that t is substituted for the free variable in φ.
21 It would be more natural just to relativize (in the usual sense) all quantifiers to φ; however, the present formulation is more convenient for the proof of Proposition 5.3 below. Given an axiom to the effect that G is closed under arithmetical equivalence (as considered in remark 6 below) both formulations would amount to the same.
3.3. Remarks. 1. G2 is sound with respect to (N, C) and (N, L), but it is not sound with respect to (N, K ), since, for example, the disjunction λ∨¬λ is not grounded according to Kripke (where λ is again the Liar sentence).
2. Axioms G3-G7 give closure conditions. This is why most of them have the form of a conditional rather than a biconditional. The result of adding the right-to-left direction of G5-G7 is not sound (with respect to L and C). For example, λ ∨ ¬λ (where λ is the Liar sentence) is grounded according to Leitgeb and Cantini, but none of its disjuncts is. In the case of Kripke, one might add axioms such as:
If one intends to axiomatize Kripke's construction with the Weak Kleene schema, then one might add stronger axioms like:
As far as I can see, this adds nothing to the proof-theoretic strength of the system (as long as G8 is assumed).
3. The idea underlying jump axiom G8 is that a sentence that attributes truth or falsity to some subset of G is itself grounded. In the statement of the axiom, φ must be arithmetical (i.e. T -free), since otherwise an inconsistency would occur.
4. As pointed out above, axioms G9-G12 are not satisfied by Leitgeb's hierarchy; rather, they apply only to the constructions of Kripke and Cantini. 5. Notice that replacing G (x) ∧ G (y) by G x∨y in the antecedent of T5 would be unsound with respect to L and C. For example, while λ ∨ ¬λ is grounded on both Leitgeb's and Cantini's approach, none of its disjuncts is grounded. For similar reasons, the antecedent of T4 can not be replaced by G x∧y . For this reason, T7 can not be derived from T1-T6. However, given the Strong or Weak Kleene schema, such a replacement is indeed sensible. In that event, T7 will be derivable.
6. One might consider the idea of adding a further axiom that states that G is closed under PAT-equivalence:
(This is indeed true for L and C, but not for K .) This would give a more unified picture, but would not add anything to the proof-theoretic strength. §4. Models. Here we present a fairly simple model of G0 + G1 + G3−G8 + T1−T7.
(Notice that models now have the form (N, X, Y ) , where X ⊆ ω interprets G and Y ⊆ ω interprets T .) Let 0 := L P A , and let α+1 ⊆ Fm L T be the smallest superset of α such that (i) whenever φ, ψ ∈ α , then φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, ¬φ, T φ ∈ α+1 , (ii) whenever φ (t) ∈ α for all t, then ∀xφ ∈ α+1 , (iii) whenever ψ is a T -free formula that (elementarily) defines a subset of α and φ is relativized (in the above sense) to ψ, then φ ∈ α+1 . At limit points, we take unions. Let be the fixed-point of this hierarchy. This will serve as our grounding hierarchy. The set of grounded truths is extracted as usual: let 0 := ∅, put α+1 := {φ ∈ α+1 | (N, α ) | φ}, and take unions at limit points. Let be the fixedpoint of this hierarchy. Then (N, , ) | G0 + G1 + G3−G8 + T1−T7, as is easily verified.
One might also start with 0 := L P A ∪ {φ|PAT φ} ∪ {φ|PAT ¬φ}, thus obtaining a model of G0−G8 + T1−T7. PROPOSITION 5.2. PAT + G0−G4 + G9 + G11 + T1−T7 is at least as strong as ID 1 .
Proof. Cantini (1990) has shown that properties (1), (2), (5), (7), (10) and (11) of Proposition 5.1 suffice to establish the desired result.
We will now show that that the systems LG and KG are at least as strong as Ramified Analysis RA < 0 . In order to do so, we show that both LG and KG are able to define 25 all truth-predicates of the system of Ramified Truth RT < 0 . 26 The language of RT < 0 is that of PA plus predicates T α for all α < 0 . The sublanguages L α of L T are defined by recursion over the ordinals up to 0 . L 0 is just L P A . For 0 < α < 0 , φ is a formula of the language L α if φ is relativized (in the sense explained above) to the formula Sent L β (x) for some β < α. Using a primitive recursive function h which substitutes every occurrence T α t in a formula of the language of RT < 0 by T t ∧ Sent L α (t) (and is otherwise structurepreserving) 27 , we can translate every formula of RT < 0 into one of L α (for some α).
That is, the translation of every sentence of the Tarski-Hierarchy up to but excluding 0 is provably grounded.
Proof. By transfinite induction up to 0 . The case α = 0 is covered by G1. Since all truth predicates in a formula of L α+1 are always relativized to some language with lower index, the induction step follows from jump axiom G8 (plus G3-G7).
In what follows, we write φ α (t) for the formula T t ∧ Sent L α (t). 25 In the sense of Fujimoto (2010) . 26 RA < 0 and RT < 0 prove the same arithmetical sentences. Cf. Halbach (2011, p. 129 ). An explicit formulation of RT < 0 is also found there. 27 For an explicit definition of h see Halbach (2011, p. 223) .
Thus, KG is at least as strong as KF, and CG is as least as strong as VF. Hence, nothing is lost when we pass from KF to KG or from VF to CG. The system LG for Leitgeb's theory proves all arithmetical sentences of KF. Notice that Kripke's construction over Weak Kleene logic (closed off version) also satisfies PAT + G1 + G3−G8 + T1−T7. §6. Comparison. We conclude with some final remarks.
1. All systems containing G0 prove the consistency axiom (Cons). It can be consistently added to KF, but is usually not a part of it, because it differs in character from the other axioms of KF. 28 Here we have it as a consequence. Furthermore, (T-Out) and (MP) are also consequences of our theories, but they are again no part of KF in its usual setting, eventhough they can be consistently added; in fact, they are consequences of KF + (Cons). 29 2. The systems LG and CG prove the weak T-rule (property (11) of Proposition 5.1). As far as I can see, it is not possible to derive the stronger global reflection principle for PAT in these systems. In CG, it is possible to prove that all axioms of predicate logic are true, that all axioms of PA are true and that the usual inference rules of predicate logic are truth-preserving. However, the most straightforward proof that all instances of induction containing the truth predicate are true requires that the truth predicate is complete, that is for all x, either T x or T¬x. And this is not a theorem of CG. 30 Of course, the reflection principle can consistently be added to both LG and CG (it can also consistently be added to KG, but the principle is not sound w.r.t. (N, K ) ). I refrained from doing so because it differs in character from the other axioms. Notice that CG plus global reflection for PAT proves axioms V1-V7 of VF. CG alone proves V1-V2 and V4-V7. Some authors complain that the axioms of VF seem somewhat unrelated and lack a common denominator. I hope the present axiomatization shows that it is possible to reformulate VF in a way that makes it look more natural.
3. The systems presented here bear some resemblance to Feferman's (2008) theory DT of determinate and meaningful truth. Feferman's idea, which derives from Bertrand Russell, is that any predicate has a domain of significance, and it makes no sense to apply a predicate outside its domain. For his theory of truth, he therefore uses two predicates, D and T , where the laws for T -the compositional axioms-apply only to members of D, and D is strongly compositional, that is if φ is a compound sentence, then all its subformulae must also be in D. As Feferman says, D consists of the determinate and meaningful sentences. And whereas it is possible that a sentence has a determinate truth value without its components having one (witness λ ∨ ¬λ), it is not possible for a sentence to be meaningful without its components being meaningful. In short, DT has axioms similar to our axioms for the Weak Kleene fixed points, as indicated in section 3.3. Indeed, Feferman even utilizes Kripke's construction using the Weak Kleene evaluation schema (plus rules for his conditional) in order to provide a model for his theory. DT might therefore be considered as part of the family of theories introduced in the present paper. §7. Acknowledgments. I want to thank Hannes Leitgeb for his valuable help in preparing this paper. This work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
